Report to Congress on Defense of Taiwan

The following is the June 4, 2026, Congressional Research Service report, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.

From the report

Taiwan, (which formally calls itself the Republic of China, or ROC) is a self-governing democracy of 23.3 million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) claims but has never controlled Taiwan. PRC leaders have stated their preference to unify peacefully with Taiwan, but have insisted on the right to use force to bring Taiwan under PRC control. U.S. policy toward Taiwan has prioritized maintaining peace and stability across the Strait. For more than 75 years, the U.S. government has sought to strengthen Taiwan’s and its own ability to deter PRC military aggression. The PRC, for its part, has claimed the United States uses Taiwan as a “pawn” to “contain” China. Congress has long championed U.S.-Taiwan defense ties, and has authorized new programs and appropriated additional funds to support Taiwan’s defense since 2022. For more information on cross-Strait relations and U.S. policy toward Taiwan, see CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Susan V. Lawrence.

Taiwan’s Security Situation

The Communist Party of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a decades-long modernization program focused primarily on developing the capabilities needed to annex Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA is, or soon will be, able to execute military campaigns ranging from missile strikes, small island seizures, and blockades, to an amphibious invasion and takeover of Taiwan’s main island. The latter would be the riskiest campaign, requiring the PLA to cross the Strait, establish a beachhead, and navigate mountainous regions and dense urban areas to subdue and control the island.

In 2023, then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Burns said PRC leader Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA “to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion” of Taiwan; Burns noted this was a goal related to military capabilities, not necessarily an indication of Xi’s intent to invade Taiwan. Observers debate whether the PLA is on track to reach the 2027 milestone, and whether Xi has the political appetite for such a risky military operation.

As its perception of the threat from the PRC has grown more acute, Taiwan’s government has taken steps to strengthen military readiness and civil resilience. Taiwan’s defense budget increased by around 7.5% from 2024 to 2025. In May 2026, Taiwan’s legislature passed a $24.8 billion, eight-year “special budget” to procure arms from the United States. Taiwan’s president has said he intends to increase defense spending to around 3.3% of GDP in 2026.

Taiwan’s policymakers disagree over how best to deter PRC aggression. While both of Taiwan’s leading political parties have said they support increased investment in Taiwan’s defense, partisan divides between the executive and the opposition-controlled legislature have raised questions about Taiwan’s ability to adequately fund its own defense. The “special budget” passed in May 2026 was 38% lower than the executive’s proposal. That proposal, which had received support from the U.S. executive branch and some Members of Congress, included funds for domestic arms development and procurement in addition to purchases from the United States. Opposition lawmakers argued that those funds should be included in annual defense budgets, which are subject to more oversight than special budgets. As of June 4, the legislature had not passed an annual defense budget for 2026. (In Taiwan, if the legislature does not pass an annual budget, the budget automatically defaults to that of the previous year.)

Beyond the defense budget, Taiwan faces additional challenges in realizing its defense goals. Its military has struggled to recruit, train, and retain personnel. Some argue Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is insufficient. Taiwan’s energy, food, water, communication, and other infrastructure are vulnerable to external disruption.

Download the document here.